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Imagine a patent claim for the following method for buying
and selling stocks: (a) a system for recording an investor's name,
available capital, a listing of stocks in which an investor is
willing to invest, a listing of percentage growth in value that the
investor would like to meet before selling a particular stock; (b)
second system for comparing the above-recorded stocks through a
list of each stock's 50-day moving average and buying selected
stocks when their value falls within 5% of their 50-day moving
average; (c) third system for selling selected stocks upon the
occurrence of the following: (i) their value falls below 10% of their
50-day moving average, or (ii) their value has met the percentage
growth that the investor wants to meet.
In essence, this patent claim is nothing more than a
variation on the old concept of "buy low, sell high." Until recently,
such a claim would have been thought of as unpatentable subject
matter, falling under a "business method" exception to statutory
patentability. A recent case, however, may have changed this
perception.!
This Note analyzes the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.' In its decision, the circuit
court eliminated both the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for
determining statutory subject matter4 and the "business method"
exception.5 The "business method" exception, which was a court-
developed doctrine on subject matter patentability, held methods
of doing business to be excluded from the scope of patentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.6 Though the exception is not apparent
1. Refer to Part IIL.B-C infra (examining the historical development of the
"business method" exception).
2. See Mark C. Dukes et al., Software Patent Protection: State Street Puts
Businesses on "Easy Street," S.C. LAW., MarJApr. 1999, at 32, 34, 39 (noting that the
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), challenges the assumption that patent protection is
unavailable to business and financial application software).
3. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
4. See id. at 1374 (stating that "the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if
any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter"). This
aspect of the court's decision is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of
this article, the word "statutory" will be used to describe whether a patent is eligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the word "patentability" will be used to
describe whether something qualifies for a patent under all of the patent law
provisions.
5. See id. at 1375-77 (finding that whether something is a business method
has nothing to do with whether it is statutory subject matter).
6. See id. at 1375 (referring to the "business method" exception as a
'judicially-created... exception to statutory subject matter"). Section 101 states
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from the language of § 101,' it had long been an accepted
principle that a method of doing business was not eligible for a
patent as a "process," even if the method was new and
nonobvious.8
This Note demonstrates that although State Street may have
expanded the scope of statutory eligibility under § 101, a
business method patent is still highly susceptible to exclusion
under §§ 102 and 103. Part III traces the development of the
"business method" exception through case law, statute, and
treatise. Part IV concentrates on the elimination of the long-
standing "business method" exception and the implications this
will have on the law. Finally, this Note concludes by returning to
the hypothetical that was introduced above and exploring the
fringes of what may now be patentable under the law.
II. RECITATION OF THE CASE
A. The Patent
The State Street case arose in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.9 State Street Bank and
Trust Company ("State Street Bank") brought an action against
Signature Financial Group, Inc. ("Signature"), seeking a
declaratory judgment that one of Signature's patents was invalid
and unenforceable." The patent in question was for a
computerized accounting system for managing a mutual fund
investment structure."'
State Street Bank and Signature are both companies that
can act as administrators and accounting agents of mutual
that "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and useful process... may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. §
101 (1994).
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
8. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F.
Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass. 1996)-(quoting 1 DONALD S. CI SUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS:
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.03[5],
at 1-75 (2000)) ("Business 'plans' and 'systems' are not patentable, even though they
may not be dependent upon the aesthetic, emotional, or judgmental reactions of a
human."), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Ex parte Murray, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1821 (Patent & Trademark Office Bd. of Patent App. &
Interferences 1988) (holding that, although "an apparatus or system capable of
performing a business function may comprise patentable subject matter, a method of
doing business generated by the apparatus or system is not").
9. See State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 502.
10. See id. at 504.
11. See id.
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funds.12 Signature owns U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056, which is
entitled "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial
Services Configuration." 3 The function of the patented invention
is to provide "a data processing system and method for
monitoring and recording the information flow and data, and [to]
mak[e] all calculations, necessary for maintaining a partnership
portfolio and partner fund (Hub and Spoke) financial services
configuration."" This invention is, in essence, an investment
structure.'5 Through this structure, an investment portfolio acts
as a "Hub" through which mutual funds, or "Spokes," can pool
their assets. 6 The district court summarized the invention as
follows:
Specifically, the invention calculates and stores data
representing: the percentage share that each Spoke fund
holds in the Hub portfolio; any daily activity affecting the
portfolio's assets; allocations of gains, losses and
expenses to each of the Spoke member funds; and
tracking and updating data that are used to determine
aggregate year-end income, gains, losses, and expenses
for accounting and tax purposes."
By pooling their assets in this way, mutual funds take
advantage of the fund administration costs associated with an
economy of scale as well as beneficial tax consequences. 8
The district court examined the first of the patent claims in
the following terms:
(1) A data processing system for managing a financial
services configuration of a portfolio established as a
partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of
funds, comprising the following:
(a) computer processor means for processing data;
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage
medium;
(c) first means for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets
in the portfolio and each of the funds from a
previous day and data regarding increases or






17. Id. at 505.
18. See id. at 504-05.
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allocating the percentage share that each fund
holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily
incremental income, expenses, and net realized
gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such
data among each fund;
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily
net unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for
allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate
year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss
for the portfolio and each of the funds.19
The district court noted that the patent examiner originally
reviewed six apparatus claims and six almost identically worded
method claims.o The patent examiner questioned the
patentability of the subject matter of both the apparatus and
method claims,2 1 and ultimately decided to grant the patent for
the apparatus claims, but not for the method claims. 2
B. Facts and Procedural History
The patent challenge in State Street arose from negotiations
between State Street Bank and Signature for a license to use
Signature's patented data processing system.3 Negotiations
broke down and "State Street [Bank] brought a declaratory
judgment action asserting invalidity, unenforceability, and
noninfringement... and then filed a motion for partial summary
judgment of patent invalidity for failure to claim statutory
subject matter under § 101."- The district court granted State
Street Bank's motion. 5
19. Id. at 505 & n.2 (commenting that by using means-plus-function language,
the claim construction was technically for an apparatus rather than a method). Such
claims that are constructed as apparatus claims are often analyzed as though they
were drawn to methods. See Louis J. Knobbe, How to Decide Whether to Obtain a
Patent: Legal Framework, in HOW TO HANDLE BASIC PATENT PROBLEMS 1992, at 9,
46 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. G-343, 1992).
20. See State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 506.
21. See id.
22. See id. (noting that the record did not disclose why the method claims were
unsuccessful).
23. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
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The district court relied on two grounds for granting the
motion for summary judgment.2 6 The first ground was based on
what the district court termed as the "mathematical
algorithm/physical transformation test," or the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test.2 7 The district court found that Signature's patent
claim failed this test because there was no physical
transformation or reduction taking place." In the district court's
view, all the system did was input, calculate, output, and store
numbers." In the eyes of the district court, this did not meet the
standard of describing "sufficient physical activity to constitute
patentable subject matter."0
The district court granted summary judgment on alternative
grounds as well, stating that its decision comported with
"another doctrinal exclusion from subject matter patentability
known as the 'business methods exception."'' The district court
supported this holding with case law and a number of treatise
references to the "business methods" exception as a "long-
established principle.""2 The district court then reinforced its
26. See State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 511, 515.
27. See id. at 511 (stating that both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Court have found that this test is the best indicator of patentability). After
describing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the district court began referring to it as
the 'mathematical algorithm/physical transformation test." See id. at 510-11. The
district court broke this test down into its respective parts. See id. at 512-13. The
court then stated that to meet the first part of the test, the patent must recite, either
directly or indirectly, a mathematical algorithm. See id. at 513. To define a
mathematical algorithm, the court cited the standard set forth in Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), which described it as "[a] procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem." See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65. The court concluded
that because the invention inputs, processes, and outputs numbers, it "must by
definition perform mathematical operations." State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 513. The
court then turned to the "physical transformation" part of the test. See id. Under
this part of the test, the court had to determine whether "the claimed invention is
applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps," stating that
"[r]egardless of whether the invention performs mathematical operations, if it
transforms or reduces subject matter to a different state or thing, it is statutory
under § 101." Id.
28. See State Street, 927 F.Supp. at 515.
29. See id. (speculating that "[tihe same functions could be performed, albeit
less efficiently, by an accountant armed with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing
system").
30. Id. (quoting In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 515-16; see also Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres,
Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1949); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160
F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908); see CHISuM, supra note 8, § 1.03[5], at 1-75 (stating
generally that "business 'plans' and 'systems' are not patentable"); 1 ERNEST
BAINBRIDGE LIPscoMB III, LIPsCoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:17, at 171 (3d ed.
1984) (recognizing that a business system is not an art and not patentable subject
matter).
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inclusion of the "business methods exception" from a policy
stand-point, reasoning that to allow the patent would, in effect,
grant Signature a monopoly on the idea of a multi-tiered
partnership portfolio-investment structure.3
C. Opinion of the Federal Circuit Court
The Federal Circuit reversed both prongs of the district
court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings."
In doing so, the circuit court eliminated two often-used grounds
for striking down software patent applications." In the circuit
court's opinion, Judge Rich analyzed the patent claim itself and
concluded that it was properly constructed as a "means-plus-
function" claim.36 The circuit court noted that the district court
had been incorrect to view the claim as a process, because the
claim, when properly construed, described a machine (the data
processing system) that was made up of specific structures. 7 The
circuit court then analyzed the exceptions that the district court
had concluded should apply.38 The circuit court analyzed the
"mathematical algorithm" exception (referring to the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test) by restating the applicable statute for subject-
matter patentability, § 101: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title."39 The circuit court found that the expansive use of
language chosen by Congress indicated its intent not to place any
additional restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter
"beyond those specifically recited in § 101.' o
33. See State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516 (commenting that the patenting of an
accounting system is the equivalent of patenting the business itself, which would be
an abstract idea and therefore unpatentable).
34. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
35. See John T. Aquino, Patently Permissive, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 30
(commenting that State Street "demolished two longtime grounds for rejecting
software patent applications," and that this "decision has been heralded as being to
patent law what Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was to the environmental
movement").
36. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370-72.
37. See id. at 1372. The "specific structures" refer to elements (a)-(g) of
Signature's claim. See id. at 1371-72.
38. See id. at 1372-77 (analyzing and dismissing as inapplicable both the
"mathematical algorithm" and the "business method" exceptions to statutory subject
matter).
39. Id. at 1372 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
40. Id. at 1373 (noting that Congress's intent was that § 101 extend to
practically anything that is man-made).
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The circuit court explored the applicability of the
"mathematical algorithm" exclusion, stating that there are "three
categories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely 'laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." ' 1 The court
noted that a mathematical algorithm standing alone is nothing
more than an "abstract idea[] until reduced to some type of
practical application."' The circuit court held that although a
mathematical algorithm was used, the claim was statutory
because it constituted a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm.43 The circuit court then attacked the district court's
application of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, stating that the
test had little if any current use in determining the presence of
statutory subject matter." The circuit court concluded its
analysis of the "mathematical algorithm" test by stating that
when determining whether a claim is statutory, the focus should
not be on the category into which the claim falls, but rather on
whether the claim is directed to "a useful, concrete, and tangible
result."
After disposing of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the circuit
court turned its attention to the "business method" exception.46
The circuit court tersely rejected the exception, stating that it
was at one time applied as a general legal principle but is no
longer applicable. The court went on to refer to the concept as
"ill-conceived." 7 The circuit court asserted that "[slince the 1952
Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been,
subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as
applied to any other process or method."48 The court went on to
say that neither it nor its predecessor court, the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), had ever relied
upon the "business method" exception to find an invention
unpatentable.49
Judge Rich then clarified that any application of the
"business method" exception was always "preceded by a ruling
based on some clearer concept of Title 35 or, more commonly,
41. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
42. Id.
43. See id. (holding that "the transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation").
44. See id. at 1374.







application of the abstract idea exception based on finding a
mathematical algorithm.""0 Judge Rich found that even in the
case that supposedly established the exception, Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.,5 the court did not rely on the
exception to strike down the patent.52 In Hotel Security, the
patent was found invalid for lack of novelty and not for ineligible
subject matter.53 The circuit court noted that the district court's
claim that the patent claim was overly broad had nothing to do
with subject matter patentability and that such concerns should
be considered under §§ 102, 103, and 112."4 Judge Rich also cited,
as evidence supporting the nonexistence of the "business method"
exception, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's 1996
Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, which
states that method-of-doing business claims should be treated
just like any other process claim.55 The circuit court concluded
that "[w]hether the claims are directed to subject matter within §
101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does
'business' instead of something else."5
III. ANALYSIS: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "BUSINESS
METHOD" EXCEPTION TO SUBJECT MATTER PATENTABILITY
A. The Development of 35 U.S.C. § 101
The concept of protecting inventions by granting intellectual
property rights is not a new one. As early as the Middle Ages,
various practices had developed to reward individuals for unique
ideas. 7 The city of Venice may have used such practices as early
as 1200 A.D."8 By 1432, the Senate of Venice had enacted a
statute which provided the following: "If somebody invents any
machine or process to speed up silk-making or to improve it, and
50. Id.; see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
51. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
52. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376 (citing Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908)).
53. See id. at 1376; Hotel Sec., 160 F. at 469-72.
54. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
55. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7479 (1996); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
56. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
57. See ROBERT A. CHOATE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
INCLUDING TRADE SECRETS-COPYRIGHTS-TRADEMARKS 63 (3d ed. 1987) (noting that
these practices were in the form of certain secondary exclusive grants).
58. See id. (indicating that protection had been granted in Venice for dredges,
wells, flour mills, and other hydro-innovations).
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if the idea is actually useful, the inventor can obtain an exclusive
privilege for ten years from the Guild Welfare Board of the
Republic."59
Similar protection was soon provided for the inventors of
many other devices and arts.6 Venice's goal was to encourage
ingenuity at home, as well as to attract inventors from other
lands.61 To promote these goals, Venice, by 1474, had enacted a
statute that is considered to be the forerunner of today's patent
statutes.62 Great Britain also had a system for establishing
protection, first in the form of royal grants and later in statutes.63
The first elements of a modern patent system appeared during
Queen Elizabeth's reign, which began in 1558.64
The colonization of America by British subjects brought with
it the desire to promote ingenuity and to stimulate
manufacture.65 Following the American Revolution, laws to
encourage invention were soon passed and adopted by various
states.66 Despite the various states' attempts at patent protection,
the framers of the Constitution recognized the need for federal
protection of inventors and authors, and thus adopted the
provision to the Constitution that would become Article I, Section
8, Clause 8.67 This provision states: "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."8
This provision was not controverted, as evidenced by the
lack of recorded debate on the matter.69 The purpose of this
provision was to encourage innovation and promote new jobs and
industry.0 Congress enacted the first patent statute in 1790 and
59. Id.
60. See id. (explaining that patent rights were also extended to cookstoves for
dye shops, the art of printing, and mills for grinding corn).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 64 (noting that this early statute required devices to be novel,
actually constructed, and useful).
63. See id. at 65.
64. See id. (mentioning that patents were granted for a dredging machine, the
making of soap, alum, and saltpeter).
65. See id. at 68.
66. See id. at 69 (noting that most patents were granted by the states through
special acts of their legislatures).
67. See id.
68. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. See CHOATE ET AL., supra note 57, at 69.
70. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2, at 10
(4th ed. 1998) (explaining that the constitutional roots of patentability serve a
positive function for society by encouraging "investment based risk").
932 [37:923
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replaced it three years later.7' These statutes introduced
fundamental concepts that remain in today's patent law,
including the four-category approach to the definition of
patentable subject matter.72 Congress revised the patent laws in
1836, and again in 1870, to make provisions for a Patent Office
and a system of examination of patent applications.73 In 1952,
Congress passed a new patent act, largely in response to the
Supreme Court's anti-patent decisions at that time.74 The Patent
Act of 1952, Title 35, § 101 enumerates which inventions are
patentable.75
Since the introduction of patents in the United States,
Congress has tried to construct a fairly complex framework of
laws to regulate the patent system.76 The majority of legislative
implementations concerning patents can be found in the Patent
Act of 1952, Title 35, United States Code.77 Included in the Patent
Act of 1952 are §§ 100 and 101, which together define the scope of
patentable subject matter.78 Section 101 generally defines the
scope of patentable subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
useful improvement thereof."79
"Process" is the most difficult one of these four terms to
define because it is generally the hardest to recognize."0 Section
100 defines "process," stating: "The term 'process' means process,
71. See CHISU!MA, supra note 8, at OV-3.
72. See id. (defining the four categories of patentable subject matter as process,
machine, manufacture, and composition of matter).
73. See id. at OV-5 to OV-7 (stating that the 1870 Act retained most of the
1836 Act's provisions); see also 1 ANTHONY WILLIAM DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 10, at 85-86 (2d ed. 1964) (reviewing the patent acts passed by Congress
from 1793-1866).
74. See CHIUSUM, supra note 8, at OV-12; see, e.g., Cuno Eng'g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-92 (1941) (refining the invention
patentability standard); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 31-32 (1931) (expanding the patent-misuse doctrine).
75. See DELLER, supra note 73, § 13, at 97-98.
76. See HARMON, supra note 70, § 1.3, at 12 (noting that this was an attempt
by Congress to create a level playing field for the marketplace of ideas).
77. See id. (observing that although there are more than thirty additional
statutory provisions that touch on patents, the Patent Act of 1952 contains the bulk
of them).
78. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT & PATENT LAW 574 (1996).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (the current section contains the exact language of
Patent Act of 1952); see also DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 574 (describing §
101 as a more general provision about what may be patented).
80. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 574 (commenting that the term
"process" demands explanation whereas machines, manufacture, and compositions
of matter are terms that are easier to define and recognize).
20001 933
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art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."81 An
early U.S. Supreme Court decision stated that "[a] process is a
mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result.
It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."
82
Under neither the statute nor the above definitions of "process" is
a "business method" exception listed. This omission of excludable
material makes the statute problematic when considering
business methods."
Insight into the meaning of § 101 can be found in the
Committee Reports accompanying the Patent Act of 1952. The
report states that "[a] person may have 'invented' a machine or a
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is
made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled."' This position
has been supported by the Supreme Court in previous cases.8
The definition, however, has its critics, and the issue is
controverted in case law.86 This reasoning, that patentable
subject matter should include anything under the sun that is
made by man, led Judge Rich to conclude that business methods
should not be per se excluded from patentability."
81. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1994).
82. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). Cochrane was cited favorably
in both Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981) and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
83. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 575 (comparing the provisions of
§§ 100 and 101 with what is defined as copyrightable material under the Copyright
Act and pointing out that § 102(b) of that act expressly notes that some things like
ideas and concepts are not afforded copyright protection).
84. S. REP. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
Senate Report 82-1979 repeats in substance House Report 82-1923. See 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2394.
85. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (determining the meaning
of the word "process"); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980)
(reporting that the Patent Act embodies Thomas Jefferson's philosophy that
ingenuity should be given "liberal encouragement").
86. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that
the Court should not attempt to extend patent protection any further than Congress
has already allowed).
87. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "[slince the 1952 Patent Act, business
methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements
for patentability as applied to any other process or method").
[37:923934
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B. The "Business Method" Exception in Treatises
The district court in State Street relied, in part, on treatises
to find a "business method" exception.' This is not surprising, as
business methods had long been thought of as not protected via
patent law.89 The concept seems to have sprung forth from the
principle that an idea or algorithm cannot, by itself, be
patented. This concept has been the cornerstone of all
intellectual property rights.9 Relying upon case law, texts have
explained that business methods are not patentable because a
business method is not an "art."92 Commentators have suggested
88. See id. at 1376 (mentioning that the district court also stated policy
concerns as its primary reason for finding the patent claim invalid under the
"business method" exception).
89. See 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.0213], at 6-
107 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that judicial construction has excluded methods of
doing business from patentable subject matter); see also CHISUM, supra note 8, §
1.0315], at 1-75 (noting that decisions have held that business plans and systems are
not patentable "even though they may not be dependent upon the aesthetic,
emotional, or judgmental reactions of a human"); Laurinda L. Hicks & James R.
Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International
Trading Agreements, 12 AM1. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 769, 772 (1997) (stating that
processes which amount only to methods of doing business are not protected by
patent law).
90. See Detmold v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 3831)
(reasoning that a patent must be for something more concrete than just an idea); Ex
parte Turner, Dec. Comm'r Pat. 36, 37-38 (1894) (advocating that "a plan or theory of
action which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical results proceeding
direct[ly] from the operation of the theory or plan itself is not an art within the
meaning of the patent laws"); Adam E. McKinney, Copyright Protection for
Functional Works: Where Does the Fifth Circuit Draw the Line Between Idea and
Expression?, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 249, 251 n.12 (1995) (noting that, because only
applied works of technology may gain patent protection, business methods are
excluded no matter how practical and useful they may be).
91. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS, § 24, at 37 (1890). Robinson states:
In its earliest stage this invention is a mere addition to the stock of ideas
possessed by the inventor. He has imagined or discovered something which
to himself, and presumably to all the world, is new, and has conceived a
method by which his idea may be so applied as to produce a tangible and
valuable result. In this stage he has a natural exclusive right to his
invention.... If, however, he endeavors to avail himself of this idea in his
exterior life, his position in regard to it is somewhat changed. The material
forms in which he then embodies it are his, but the idea itself is not to be
imprisoned within their narrow bounds.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See CHISUI, supra note 8, § 1.03[5], at 1-75 to 1-78.1 (stating that court
decisions hold business plans not patentable); DELLER, supra note 73, § 26, at 152
(noting that a system of doing business is not an "art' and does not fall under any
other designation of patentable subject matter); see also Munson v. Mayor of New
York, 124 U.S. 601, 605 (1888) (contending that a business system established to
organize bonds cannot be patentable because it does not involve any invention);
Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (declaring
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that the only possible way to get such a claim patented is by a
machine claim." This may be why the patent claim in State
Street was phrased as a "means-plus-function" claim."
Though the "business method" exception still appears in a
number of texts, recent cases seem to have influenced current
patent treatises. 5 Prior to the State Street decision, many
casebooks mentioned the different process claims that had been
successful in the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.96 It
does not seem, however, that the total elimination of the
"business method" exception was anticipated because the
exception was still mentioned." Commentators have argued for
the removal of the "business method" exception," but the fact
that the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP")
recognized the exception has always worked against such
arguments.99 The 1996 version of the MPEP, however, omits any
that "[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying
out the system is not... an art"); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 581 (1999) (noting that because patents are
meant to protect technology, business methods, which are not tied to any particular
machine or device, were always viewed as pure concepts and, therefore,
unpatentable).
93. See HARMON, supra note 70, § 2.2(b)(iii), at 49 (speculating that business
methods are probably ineligible as method claims).
94. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that each claim component was recited as a
means plus its function and was thus construed as a machine claim).
95. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 604-05 (commenting on the old
rule of thumb of a per se ban on business methods, but noting that recent cases have
allowed for the patenting of business methods that utilize programs); Louis J.
Knobbe, supra note 19, at 9, 48 (stating that although the Patent and Trademark
Office may reject "method of doing business" claims, exceptions do exist).
96. See Knobbe, supra note 19, at 18-22, 48 (noting that exceptions to the
"business method" exception were prevalent); DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at
604-05 (citing Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), as support for the theory that a
business method that utilizes a program can be patented).
97. See Knobbe, supra note 19, at 48 (noting that although business method
claims are often rejected, exceptions exist).
98. See id. at 18-19 (suggesting that of the cases cited for the "business
method" exception, none supported a sweeping mandate that all business methods
are not patentable); E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. Pollack, Is the "Method of Doing
Business" Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CiR. B.J. 73, 84 (1993) (concluding that,
although many people assume the "method of doing business" is not patentable, no
authoritative source has provided a satisfying explanation for its exclusion); Rinaldo
Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a
Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 411 (1998) (mentioning that commentators have
found the business method exception to be "ghostlike in nature").
99. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (5th ed. 1983) [hereinafter MPEP
1983] ("Though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of
doing business can be rejected as not being within the statutory classes."); see also
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reference to the exception.' Judge Rich cited this omission as
supporting the elimination of the exception.' Clearly, the
decision in State Street will affect patent treatises, but the full
impact of the case has yet to be felt in the legal academic
community.
102
C. Case Law Development
The "business method" exception appears to have developed
through case law."03 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.'
is the case most often cited as giving rise to the "business
method" exception.0 5 In Hotel Security, the patent claim at issue
was for a "'method of and means for cash-registering and account
checking' designed to prevent frauds and peculation by waiters
and cashiers in hotels and restaurants.""6 The system required
each waiter to wear a badge with a designated number on it.'
Each waiter was then given order slips with this same number
on them.' 8 When a waiter turned in an order, the kitchen filled it
and made an entry into a register under that waiter's number.9
When a customer paid the cashier, the cashier would keep the
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377 (quoting the MPEP fifth edition in 1994 as retaining
the exact language of the original fifth edition in 1983); Knobbe, supra note 19, at 18
(observing that the U.S. Patent Office instructs its examiners that a method of doing
business claim can be rejected as outside the proper statutory class); David
Abraham, Suggestions for Improved Intellectual Property Protection of Software, or
Where is Alexander When You Really Need Him?, 23 S.U. L. REV. 293, 301 (1996)
(speculating that a patent examiner would reject a claim for an improved system of
bookkeeping under the "business methods" exception).
100. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMIERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter MPEP
1996]; see also Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996) (stating that
business method claims should be treated "like any other process claim[]").
101. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
102. See Dukes et al., supra note 2, at 39 (suggesting that the State Street
decision will impact issues of patent timing, breadth of coverage and disclosures);
Francisc Marius Keeley-Domokos, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 172 (1999) (predicting an
explosive academic debate over the State Street decision).
103. See Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 405 (noting that an early patent treatise
contained no discussion of business methods).
104. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
105. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376 (relating that Hotel Security is frequently
cited as establishing the "business method" exception); Del Gallo, supra note 98, at
405 (commenting that the Hotel Security case is commonly believed to be the origin
of the exception).
106. Hotel Sec., 160 F. at 467.




slips."' The cashier's records were then compared to the kitchen's
register to detect any dishonesty."'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Hotel
Security that the means described in the claim-a sheet of paper
and order slips--did not present any new or useful feature apart
from the manner in which they were used."' Therefore, the
patent claim lacked novelty."' The court also felt that, because
the essential features were old, any changes made to those
features would simply belong to the evolution of the business of
restaurant and hotel keeping."' The court used this reasoning to
hold that even if the claim were novel, it would nevertheless fail
because of its obviousness to those in the same business.' The
court reserved the question of how to treat a claim for a method
that was new and nonobvious,"6 stating that the "question seems
never to have been decided by a controlling authority and its
decision is not necessary now.""7 Thus, although the court struck
down a "method of doing business" in its decision, it left open the
possibility that a claim might come along that was so new and
nonobvious that it should be judged on its own merits."' Earlier
in the opinion, however, the court warned, "A system of
transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying
out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of
the term, an art.""9 It is from this statement that the "business
method" exception sprang forth.2 '
Another frequently cited case supporting the "business
method" exception is Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 469.
113. See id. at 472 (noting that the claimed improvements were not new and
useful and that the "overwhelming weight of authority" found such claims to be
unpatentable).
114. See id. at 470 (expressing the belief that any "clever and ingenious person
familiar with the needs of that business" would have come up with such a method).
115. See id. at 471.
116. See id. at 472. Although the court used the word "new" instead of
"nonobvious," it seems clear from the context of the opinion that they were concerned
with nonobviousness. See id. at 470 (stating that the changes were attributable to
the evolution of the business, thus implying that the change was natural and
obvious).
117. Id. at 472.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 469.
120. See Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 408 (proposing that with one sentence, the
court gave birth to the "business method" exception); see also State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting




Theatres, Inc.'21 At the time of the Loew's case, drive-in theatres
were commercially successful. 122 The patent claim at issue in
Loew's was for a system of parking cars in an open lot so that all
could see the movie without obstruction." The lower court held
that the patent claim was nonobvious over the prior art and
noted its novelty and success." The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, cast aside these findings and instead
concentrated on what it considered to be the more important
question of "whether, given the idea or conception of an open-air
drive-in theatre, an exercise of the inventive faculty was required
to devise the means for carrying it out." 25  The court
acknowledged the lower court's findings of novelty, usefulness
and commercial success of drive-in theatres, but stated that these
findings were of no real concern. 26 They focused instead on the
instrumentalities, which made the system useful.27 The court
found that the instrumentalities did not involve an exercise of
the faculty of invention 8 because the method was not novel.
29
The court also explained that even if there was novelty, the
method was merely an application that anyone skilled in the art
would have constructed and was, therefore, obvious."' ° Though
the circuit court based its reversal on these grounds, it prefaced
its finding by stating that a system of doing business, no matter
how "novel, useful, or commercially successful is not patentable
apart from the means for making the system practically useful,
or carrying it out."3 ' This decision is often cited as adding to the
case law the proposition that business methods as a group are
unpatentable. 2
A more recent case cited in support of the "business method"
exception is Murray, which involved a patent claim for an
121. 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949).
122. See Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 414.
123. See Loew's, 174 F.2d at 550-51 (discussing a method whereby cars were
parked on a hill sloped toward the screen and positioned in specific stallways to
allow a clear view).
124. See id. at 548, 552.
125. Id. at 551-52.
126. See id. at 552 (emphasizing that the focus was on the mechanical
application of the system).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 553. This standard has since been abandoned. See 35 U.S.C. §
102 (1994).
129. See Loew's, 174 F.2d at 553 (positing that the claimed method would occur
to anyone skilled in the field and that the art did not have to wait years for the
discovered method to evolve).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 552.
132. See Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 413-14.
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accounting system.13 The system provided a method for financial
institutions, such as banks, to enter credit and debit information
under a client's account number and then provide the client with
a detailed transaction report.34 The patent office rejected the
Murray claim on two grounds: (1) for inadequate specification
under 35 U.S.C. § 112;"' and (2) for being directed toward
nonpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 6 On
appeal, the Examiner in Chief rejected the first ground, but
agreed that the patent claim was directed toward nonstatutory
subject matter under the "business method" exception.137 Though
the Examiner in Chief recognized the difficulty in defining what
falls into the "business method" exception, the patent claim in
this case was clearly a method of doing business, thus making it
unpatentable. 131 It is important to note, however, that this case
was before the Patent Examiner in Chief, and not the Federal
Circuit, at a time when the MPEP still recognized a "business
method" exception. 39
Another case discussing the "business method" exception,
and cited by the Murray court,4 ' is In re Wait."' Wait may have
been one of the earliest cases to recognize that business methods
are not per se excludable. " 2 The patent in Wait involved a method
of buying and selling stocks and other commodities by means of
an electrical system. 3 The patent examiner rejected the claim on
two grounds: (1) the claim described no operative system; and (2)
the claim was directed toward a process of doing business." The
Board of Appeals overruled the first ground but upheld and
133. See Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1820 (Patent & Trademark
Office Bd. of Patent App. & Interferences 1988).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1820. Section 112 states in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
136. See Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1820.
137. See id. at 1820-21.
138. See id. ("While it may in some situations be problematic to ascertain what
falls within the penumbra of the judicially prescribed 'method of doing business,' we
find no such difficulty in the present case.") (footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 1819; MPEP 1983, supra note 99, at § 706.03(a).
140. See Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1820.
141. 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
142. See id. at 983.




modified the second ground, adding that in addition to being a
business method, the claim also lacked the exercise of
invention.'45 The C.C.P.A upheld the Board's ruling, but held
only that the claim lacked novelty.'46 The court did not comment
on whether the claim as a business method should be excluded,
but left open the possibility: "That a physical system contrived to
enable the carrying out of transactions such as those described
might be patentable, in the absence of anticipatory prior art, is
quite conceivable."47
A more recent case challenged the "business method"
exception even further. In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,14 the patent claim
in question was for a data-processing apparatus for effecting a
cash management account.' The cash management account
program was offered through Merrill Lynch and combined three
commonly offered financial services.' Merrill Lynch was also the
assignee of the patent.'' Paine Webber contended that the patent
was not directed toward patentable subject matter under the
"business method" exception.'52 Merrill Lynch defended that it did
not claim a process but rather a machine under a "means plus
function" form.5 3 The court left unanswered the question of
whether the claim was directed toward a machine or a process
because the analysis at hand was directed toward subject matter
and labels were deemed not determinative in such an analysis."M
The court first found that the claim was not for an algorithm but
rather for a "highly efficient business system."'5 The court then
examined the claim under the "business method" exception.
The court seemingly ignored the existence of the exception and
instead concentrated on the operation of the computer program.The court held that the claim met the threshold requirement of §
145. See id. A uniform standard for nonobviousness was not adopted until the
Patent Act of 1952. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (defining the obviousness standard).
146. See Wait, 73 F.2d at 983 (noting that some business methods might present
patentable novelty, but that novelty was lacking in this case).
147. Id.
148. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
149. See id. at 1361, 1363-64.
150. See id. at 1361 (noting that the three financial services were a brokerage
security account, money market funds, and a charge or checking account).
151. See id. at 1363.
152. See id. at 1365.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1366.
155. See id. at 1368.
156. See id. at 1368-69.
157. See id. at 1369.
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101 because the claim allegedly taught "a method of operation on
a computer to effectuate a business activity."5 ' The court
conceded, however, that the very same claim, though highly
useful, "would be unpatentable if done by hand."159
This dichotomy of treatment between a business method
through a computer program and one that is written by hand
seems strange, but it may have been the court's way of
rationalizing what it felt was established law. 6 ' The court may
also have just been reiterating the principle that an idea is not
patentable. 6' Whatever the court meant, it established a new
caveat to the exception that business methods are unpatentable
subject matter-that system claims receive greater leniency than
method claims.'62
In the case of In re Schrader,.6 the "business method"
exception received harsh criticism in a dissent by Judge
Newman."M The patent claim in Schrader was directed toward
auctions and a method of ascertaining whether the price offered
for a parcel of land as a whole was greater than the sum of the
prices that could be obtained by selling individual
subcomponents of the parcel.'65 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reviewed the decision of the Patent and
Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("PTO Board"), which had denied the patent claim based on three
issues.'66 First, the claimed process involved only an information
exchange and not a process that transformed an article to a
different state.'67 Second, the patent claimed a method that
involved a mathematical algorithm at its heart.68 Third, the
claim was analogous to the claim rejected in Murray, which the
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 421 & n.109 (noting the "fuzzy line" that is
created between what is being patented as to a method or the apparatus used in the
method).
161. See id. at 420 (stating that the computer and electricity "added the physical
means necessary for patentability").
162. See id. at 421; Knobbe, supra note 19, at 21; see also Ex parte Murray, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1821 (Patent & Trademark Office Bd. of Patent App. &
Interferences 1988) (distinguishing Paine, Webber because it was directed toward a
system and the patent had no method claims).
163. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
164. See id. at 296-99; Del Gallo, supra note 98, at 411 (speculating that this
may be the "most excoriating criticism" of the "business method" exception).
165. See Schrader, 22 F.3d at 291.





court held to be binding.'69 The circuit court upheld the PTO
Board's finding that the claim was not patentable because it was
directed toward a mathematical algorithm and did not constitute
a reduction to a different state as required by a process."
In her dissent, Judge Newman disagreed with the circuit
court's decision that the patent did not meet the subject matter
requirements of § 101, but agreed that the patent should be
remanded for lack of patentability on other grounds.17" ' After
discussing the patentability of the claim under the algorithm
framework, Judge Newman criticized the "business method"
exception as an "unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of
statutory subject matter in section 101."' She went on to
advocate that the exception be discarded as "error-prone,
redundant, and obsolete." 7' Criticizing Hotel Security, the case
often relied upon as establishing and supporting the "business
method" exception,' she argued that many cases reciting the
exception were decided on grounds quite apart from the
exception. 7 ' Judge Newman reasoned that the cases only
affirmed the idea that patents should be directed toward tangible
things, not mere ideas, but that in the complexity of modern
business systems any distinctions between a method of doing
business and the means of carrying out business have blurred
together.'76 Judge Newman concluded her analysis of the
exception by stating that "[p]atentability does not turn on
whether the claimed method does 'business' instead of something
else, but on whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets the
requirements of patentability as set forth in Sections 102, 103,
and 112 of the Patent Act."
77
169. See id.
170. See id. at 294-96.
171. See id. at 296 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that remand was necessary
because of "inadequate examination for patentability under sections 102 and 103").
172. Id. at 296-98 (Newman, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting).
174. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (observing that under Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908), 'jurisprudence does not
require the creation of a distinct business class of unpatentable subject matter").
175. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
176. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYZING STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO. V. SIGNATURE
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
A. Interpretation of the Holding in State Street
The Federal Circuit's decision to uphold the patentability of
the claim in State Street is consistent with the direction of case
law.78 The argument that the doctrine is nonexistent, as
articulated by Judge Rich, is very similar to Judge Newman's
dissent in Schrader."9 In fact, Judge Rich cited Judge Newman's
dissent to support his claim that since the passage of the Patent
Act of 1952, the same standards used for other method claims
should have applied to business methods. 80 Judge Rich, however,
went further than Judge Newman by stating that the exception
had never been invoked by the Federal Circuit or the C.C.P.A. to
find an invention unpatentable.' Judge Newman had merely
asserted that all "doing business" cases could have been rejected
on some clearer grounds.' Judge Rich's sweeping statement,
coupled with the overwhelming amount of case law and
established treatise law, makes this decision worthy of careful
analysis. 8 '
The foundation of intellectual property is to promote
invention and ingenuity."M The broad language used by Congress
in § 101 certainly seems to support this concept."& The courts'
recent approaches to other subjects also support a liberal
construction of patentable subject matter.8 ' Over the past three
178. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 169-70 (explaining that the
decision in State Street follows an emerging theory of textual statutory
interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of statutory language construed in
the context of the entire statute).
179. Compare State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (arguing that the "business method" exception is
"ill-conceived" and "no longer applicable"), with Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298 (Newman,
J., dissenting) (characterizing the exception as "fuzzy" and urging that it be
"discarded as error-prone, redundant, and obsolete").
180. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 & n.10.
181. See id. at 1375.
182. See Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting).
183. Refer to Part HI.B-C supra.
184. Refer to notes 65-76 supra and accompanying text.
185. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1981) (explaining that the use
of the word "process" in the Patent Act of 1952 broadened the scope of what is
considered patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-
09 (1980) (recognizing that although patentable subject matter encompasses a broad
category, it is not limitless); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (stating that Congress's
repetitive use of the word "any" in § 101 indicates support for the expansive view of
patentable subject matter).
186. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 600-08 (summarizing recent
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decades, the law concerning subjects such as computer programs
and materials derived from living organisms has undergone
sweeping changes in the direction of favoring patentability.187
Thus, the State Street decision may be a natural step in the
evolution of patent law.188  The arguments for promoting
innovation in the field of business methods do, however, have
critics. They argue that the motivation to innovate is an inherent
part of our economic system.189 As such, there is no need to
promote and protect innovations.' Furthermore, there is the
danger that a monopoly on certain business methods could
develop.' If the State Street decision stands for the proposition
that all methods of doing business would now receive patents,
this might be a danger. But, clearly, the decision does not go that
far.192
Judge Rich asserted that the "business method" exception
was "ill-conceived" and the establishment of § 103 should have
completely done away with any need for the exception. 9' This
assertion could certainly explain some of the early decisions that
recite the exception, but there have been many cases since the
passage of the Patent Act of 1952 that have also mentioned, if not
relied upon, the exception.9 The State Street court specifically
struck down the appellee's argument that In re Maucorps9' and
In re Meyer 9 ' relied on the "business method" exception."97 The
liberal patentability approaches to business methods, biologicals, and designs).
187. See id. (noting the liberalization of patents for computer programs and
living organisms); see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d
156, 160-62 (4th Cir. 1958) (describing a product-claim suit in which the product was
a patented B vitamin derived from fermentation materials).
188. See Merges, supra note 92, at 587-88 (noting the trend in patent law from
granting very few patents to viewing patent protection with a "why not" approach).
189. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 167-68 (stating that "the incentive
to innovate in a functional business context is inherently embedded in the nature of
the economic system").
190. See id. at 168 (noting that companies will develop new methods of doing
business regardless of whether those methods can be patented).
191. See id. at 168-69 (acknowledging the argument that "patentability of
methods of doing business amounts to a protection of the fundamental tools for
economic competition and progress ... [and] erodes the concept of a free market
economy").
192. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1377 (asserting that "business method" claims should be treated the same as
any other method claim, the breadth of which should be judged under §§ 102, 103,
and 112).
193. See id. at 1375.
194. See, e.g., Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1821 (Patent &
Trademark Office Bd. of Patent App. & Interferences 1988) (declining patent
protection based upon "a method of doing business, and/or ... an algorithm").
195. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
196. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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State Street court asserted that the claims in both Maucorps and
Meyer were rejected under the mathematical algorithm
exception.198 Though the State Street decision gives only a brief
explanation of a few more recent cases, the court seems to be
asserting that these cases are just examples of either obviousness
or lack of subject matter. In some cases,'00 this seems a
strenuous assertion, but it is certainly arguable that, in every
instance, the court at least could have found a patent claim
invalid on other grounds."' A convincing argument advanced by
the court is the omission of any reference to the "business
method" exception from the 1996 MPEP.02 The court makes clear
that the per se ban is no longer in place, assuming it ever existed
at all.0 3 Given the absence of any mention of the "business
method" exception in § 101, this result is not surprising."4
Additionally, because the "business method" exception was
judicially created, some commentators argue that such
exceptions should be left to Congress to create. 5
If the "business method" exception is eliminated, how should
courts treat such claims? The State Street court declared,
"Whether the claims are directed to subject matter within § 101
should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does
'business' instead of something else."0 6 The court also asserted
that such claims are still subject to the normal standards of §§
102, 103, and 112.27 This assertion gives some guidance as to
how a claim for a method of doing business might be treated, but
it is really, at most, just a framework.0 ' The treatment of
197. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376.
198. See id; see also Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795-96; Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 484, 486.
199. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375-76 (stating that some earlier claims
lacked novelty or were abstract ideas).
200. See Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1820-21 (Patent &
Trademark Office Bd. of Patent App. & Interferences 1988) (observing that although
some "business method" claims may be difficult to decide, the instant patent claim
was clearly an unpatentable method of doing business).
201. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (positing that decisions reciting the "business method" exception could
have relied on statutory requirements such as unobviousness and novelty).
202. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
203. See id.
204. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 169-70 (noting that under the
court's textualist approach, the result in State Street was inevitable).
205. See id. at 170 (stating that the judicial branch is not adequately equipped
to handle creating such a doctrine).
206. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
207. See id.
208. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 167 (speculating that the decision
in State Street has only defined the framework for the analysis and criticism that
will follow).
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method-of-doing-business claims may still be subject to
interpretation by courts.0 9 If, as Judge Rich suggested, all past
method-of-doing-business claims were held invalid on grounds
other than the "business method" exception, then it makes sense
to believe that future claims will remain susceptible to the
pitfalls of lack-of-novelty, obviousness, or failure to state an art.
2 10
B. Ramifications of State Street
The full impact of the State Street decision is still
unknown. 211  To date, two cases, AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.2"2 and WMS Gaming Inc. v. International
Game Technology,"3 have cited the State Street decision, and
neither of these cases have challenged the "business method"
exception further. 4
Does State Street mean that a business method that is
properly claimed will be granted a patent? To illustrate the
problems a claim could face, consider the mock claim put forth at
the beginning of this Note.1 5 The claim is essentially the old
business concept of "buy low, sell high." If this claim were termed
as a "means-plus-function" claim, it would be similar to the claim
in State Street.2 6 As Judge Rich noted, however, business method
claims must still clear the hurdles of §§ 102, 103 and 112.7 The
claimed process of "buy low, sell high" is obviously not a new
209. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377 (stating that the broadness of patent
claims must be judged under §§ 102, 103, and 112).
210. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507
(1874) (holding that a concept for an eraser was merely an idea and unpatentable);
Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 553 (1st Cir.
1949) (holding that the claimed method was obvious to one skilled in the art); In re
Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.. 1934) (finding that the invention at issue lacked
novelty); Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329, 333 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding that the
claimed patent was really only for advice, which is unpatentable subject matter);
Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding that
the claimed system was neither novel nor nonobvious).
211. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 172 (noting that "academic debate
concerning the social, economic and legal implications of the State Street decision...
is certain to erupt"); Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that whether business
methods will require computerization to be patentable is still uncertain).
212. 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
213. 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
214. See id. at 1342-44 (comparing patents for electronic slot machines); Excel,
172 F.3d at 1354 (reviewing a method of encoding customer data for identification
purposes).
215. Refer to Part I supra (suggesting a means-plus-function claim for a
business method of buying stocks at a low price and selling them for a higher price).
216. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claiming a data processing system).
217. See id. at 1377.
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
idea, and thus would lack the requisite novelty under § 102.218 It
could also be argued that the claimed process is obvious to
anyone skilled in the field.219 Assuming, however, that this was a
new, nonobvious claim, it would seemingly be completely
acceptable subject matter for a patent under State Street.2 °
What if the claimed business method (assuming it is novel
and nonobvious) was not articulated through a "means-plus-
function" claim or did not require a computer? Either of these
scenarios would raise a new issue: How would the court deal
with a business method that is independent of a computer
system?22' The answer may be that the claim would fail for
being an abstract idea and not a process. 2 Courts have
struggled with the definition of the word "process" as it
appears in § 101.22' The Supreme Court has stated,
"Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different
state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim
that does not include particular machines. "224 A process must
still be useful, and without some instrumentality by which the
idea or system can be made useful or reduce something to a
different state, a court might decide that the business method
is merely an abstract idea.2 ' The system in State Street met
218. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Section 102 states in relevant part: "A person
shall be entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known or used by others
in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication... before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent. ... " Id. Subsections (b)-(g) also
provide that the abandonment, prior invention, or use of an invention make a patent
invalid. Id.
219. See, e.g., Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 471 (2d Cir.
1908) (arguing that even if the system claimed was novel, it was an improvement
that would be obvious to anyone conversant in the business).
220. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377 (stating that business method claims
should be judged as any other claims); see also In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (commenting on an application for patent of a vending process and proposing
that it would be quite conceivable that "a physical system contrived to enable the
carrying out of transactions such as those described might be patentable, in the
absence of anticipatory prior art").
221. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that this is an unanswered
question in light of State Street).
222. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983) (stating explicitly that "[tihe
product of the claims of the '442 patent effectuates a highly useful business method
and would be unpatentable if done by hand"); see also Aquino, supra note 35, at 30
(reporting that although the issue is an unsettled question, claims will probably still
require physical transfer to a machine).
223. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) (restating various
definitions of process and noting that although no instrumentality is needed, a
reduction or transformation of an article to a different state is necessary).
224. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
225. See Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547,
552 (1st Cir. 1949) (focusing on the physical instrumentality "by which it [the idea or
[37:923948
20001 OPENING THE DOOR 949
this standard by transforming data into a final share price.2 '6
The difference between obtaining approval of a patent or being
turned down could simply depend, then, upon expressing the
business method through a computer system so that an
instrumentality would exist by which the claim could perform
a transformation or become useful."' This would create a
system similar to the idea-expression dichotomy that exists in
copyright law.2" It is not clear, however, that to meet subject
matter patentability, an applicant would simply need to
involve a computer. Hypothetically, the claim in State Street
could also have been for a method done by hand.229 Had it been,
and the court followed the Paine, Webber decision, the method
done by hand would be ineligible for a patent. 2
Alternatively, the court might determine that all business
methods are valid processes whether they have an
instrumentality or not.21 Such a determination could fly in the
face of the principle that an idea cannot be patented.12 Of course,
the State Street court did not hold that all business methods are
valid processes.1 3 It merely eliminated the "business method"
exception from the subject-matter plane. 4 Business methods
system] is made practically useful") (alteration in original); Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F.
329, 333 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (striking down a patent claim because the court felt
that the process claimed was nothing more than a system of devising code messages
and amounted to nothing more than advice, which is not an art).
226. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
227. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1369 (focusing on the operation of
the computer and stating that the same procedure, done by hand, would be invalid);
see also Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that the physical transfer of an idea to a
machine may still be required).
228. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 78, at 259-61 (noting that the
"fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea . . . is
protectable has produced a corollary maxim that... expression is not protected...
where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the
expression would effectively ... protect[1 the idea itself') (internal citation omitted).
229. The patent claim in State Street was, essentially, for nothing more than an
accounting system. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. Although the State Street
court noted that the patent claim used a computer, the court did not explicitly state
that a computer was required. See id. at 1371, 1373.
230. See Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1369 (upholding a patent on a data
processing methodology and stating that such a process done by hand would be
unpatentable).
231. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (stating that a literal reading of State
Street would permit this).
232. Refer to Part H.B supra (discussing basic patent law principles); see also
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (20 Wall.) (1874) ("An idea of itself is
not patentable."); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the patent system is not directed toward mere ideas).
233. Refer to Part IV.A supra.
234. See id.
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will, however, still be difficult, overall, to protect unless they are
truly novel and nonobvious."5
The effect of the State Street decision has already been felt at
the patent office, which has seen a large increase in the filing of
computer-related claims, including those for business methods.236
The decision has also cleared the way for more computer-
program patents.237 Many businesses are now being encouraged
to seek patents on their methods of operations and the ways in
which they conduct business.238 The patent office has also
approved more software patents since the decision.239
Congress reacted to the State Street decision by passing the
First Invention Defense Act of 1999, which President Clinton
signed into law on November 29, 1999.4 This act purports to
create a new defense to an action for patent infringement on
methods of doing business. 1 The act allows the defense as long
as two requirements are met: (1) the accused method must have
been independently developed and reduced to practice over a
year before the filing date of the offended patent; and (2) the
accused method must have been used commercially before the
2
effective filing date of the patent. This means that even if a
patentee invented a method before a particular user, the
patentee might not necessarily succeed against that particular
243
commercial user.
The State Street decision has definitely affected attitudes
about what is patentable.2" The outer limits of this area have yet
235. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that patent claims still have many
barriers to overcome and that many patent claims still get rejected).
236. See id. (reporting a 45% increase at the patent office in the number of data
processing and computer-related patents issued during its 1998 fiscal year).
237. See John M. Carson & Eric M. Nelson, Legal Victory for Electronic
Commerce Companies: State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group
Signals Fall of Last Barrier to Internet Software Patents, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REv.
193, 206 (1999) (stating that any computer software which directs a machine to
produce a useful, concrete and tangible result is patentable).
238. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (stating that businesses are being
encouraged not to "sit on the fence," but to seek patents if for no other reason than to
avoid infringing on others' patents).
239. See id. (noting that more software patent applications are being approved).
240. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat. 1501) 555-56 (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273). See also Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley,
Patent and Trademark Law; Recent Statutory Changes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at 3.
241. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(b) (West Supp. 2000); Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra
note 240, at 3.
242. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(1) (West. Supp. 2000); Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra
note 240, at 3.
243. See Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra note 240, at 3.
244. See Carson & Nelson, supra note 237, at 206-08 (listing some of the
possible questions the court has yet to answer).
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to be tested. 5 If process claims are available for certain applied
algorithms and for business methods, then are they also
available for sports moves" or methods of skipping class?247
Exactly how far the courts will allow computer process claims to
go is still unknown, but if the current trend continues, subjects
such as the above may indeed be patentable. 8
V. CONCLUSION
Patents exist to protect the rights of inventors and to
promote innovation.249 The courts' attitudes toward what they
will and will not recognize as patentable have varied throughout
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries." The approach at
the time the "business method" exception was supposedly created
was one of "why should a patent be granted," and this skepticism
may explain why the doctrine was recognized for so many
years. 1  Over the past century, however, attitudes and
technology have drastically changed.
Since the time of the Hotel Security case, advances in the
field of science and the advent of computers have forced the
courts to constantly rethink and rework their approaches to
patent law. 2' Judge Rich, who was born at the turn of the
Twentieth century, was well aware of these many changes; it is
fitting that he was the one to articulate an opinion reflecting his
own pro-patent approach.43
245. See id. at 207-08 (describing several "vanguard" patents that have yet to be
challenged in court).
246. See generally Jeffrey A. Smith, It's Your Move-No It's Not! The Application
of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051 (1999) (examining the
possibility of patenting sports moves).
247. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 102, at 153-55 (illustrating that a method
of skipping class can be expressed along the lines of the patent upheld in State
Street).
248. See Carson & Nelson, supra note 237, at 206-08; Keeley-Domokos, supra
note 102, at 153 (proposing that the illustrated method of skipping class may be
patentable); Smith, supra note 246, at 1051 (relating that some have proposed that
sports moves may be patentable).
249. Refer to notes 65-71 supra and accompanying text (discussing the genesis
of American patent law).
250. Refer to Part I.C supra (tracking the case law development of patentable
subject matter).
251. See Merges, supra note 92, at 587 (noting that into the early 1980s, the
legal system assumed that intellectual creations were not protectable unless good
cause could be shown).
252. Refer to Part I1-.C supra (illustrating how courts have handled innovative
technology).
253. See Nell A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles Rich, 1904-
1999, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 913-14 (1999) (noting that Judge Rich's
personal experience of technological change influenced his liberal view of patents).
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State Street marks the elimination of the "business method"
exception as a per se ban on business method claims.u 4 State
Street, does not, however, stand for the proposition that all
business method claims will now be approved under § 101.211
Because State Street's "business method" exception predecessors
were all held unpatentable (or at least could have been) on other
grounds, it is logical to assume that subsequent business method
patents will be subject to the same pitfalls. 6
Even if a claim clears either the novelty or nonobviousness
hurdles to patentability, it still must fall under one of the
subject-matter classes.' This hurdle would manifest itself in the
form of a finding of whether a method of doing business is really
a process or an art." For the time being, it appears that such
claims will have higher probabilities of success if expressed
through a computer program, 9 which would provide the
instrumentality by which the idea or system could reduce
something to a different state .2 " How the court would treat a
State Street claim not involving a computer program (i.e., done by
hand), is not clear.26' Past case law and basic principles of patent
law would view such a claim as being a mere idea that is
unpatentable.262 If all it takes to become patentable is an
instrumentality such as a computer program, then patent law
may eventually mirror the idea-expression dichotomy of
copyright law. 3
254. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the "business method" exception is no
longer valid).
255. See id. at 1377 (recognizing that business method claims should be
evaluated like any other process or method claim).
256. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there are ample statutory requirements by which to
evaluate patentability without relying on the "business method" exception).
257. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (listing the subject matter classes of "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter").
258. See id. (including as patentable inventions "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"); 35 U.S.C. § 100 (defining
"process" as "process, art or method").
259. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (stating that although it is an unsettled
question, a physical machine is most likely necessary for patentability of such
processes).
260. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that a
computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter
because a computer is an "apparatus not mathematics").
261. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 ("The question is whether the [State
Street] ruling will permit companies to patent marketing practices regardless of
whether they are computerized . ").
262. Refer to Parts III.B-C supra (explaining case law analyses of patentable
subject matter and recognizing that an idea is not patentable).
263. Refer to notes 227-30 supra and accompanying text (exploring this
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The shackles of the "business method" exception have been
removed. How far the courts will now go in allowing business
method claims is anyone's guess, but the current trend is
definitely more pro-patent.2 This new-found freedom of business
methods has already led to more computer-related patent
applications, which will surely lead to further litigation of the
issue. 6 ' After State Street, there are new frontiers in patent law
to be explored. Methods of doing business may still constitute a
somewhat suspect class of subject matter, and the limits are not
fully defined under the broad framework provided in the State
Street decision. Although the fringes of what will be allowed are
as yet undefined, further litigation of business method patents
should help answer many of the remaining questions.
Colin P. Marks
possibility).
264. See Aquino, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that the patent office is issuing
more computer-related patents).
265. See id.
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